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Japanese Corporate Governance Reform:
A Comparative Perspective
Bruce E. Aronson*
Japan has been widely criticized as being slow to reform a
corporate governance system that seemingly remains fixed on the
interests of employees over shareholders and unresponsive to recent
global trends such as the spread of fidependent directors. This article
seeks to present a more nuanced and balanced view of the ongoing
e volu tion of Japanese corporate go vernance.
This article discusses how analysis of Japanese corporate
governance is hampered by the lack of both an agreed-upon standard
for evaluating change in Japan and data concerning important
governance practices, such as the actual role of company auditors
(kansayaku). The main focus, however, is on describing and
evaluating experimentation at leading individual Japanese companies
that seeks to address monitoring and other fundamental issues of
corporate governance in Japan by de veloping a "hybrid" system of
governance. This system attempts to combine the best elements of the
board management and monitoring models, i.e., the information
access of insiders and the independence of outsiders, in a way that
results in real board discussion and management oversight.
The article goes on to identify and briefly discuss three key issues
that may be critical in influencing the future direction of Japan 's
corporate governance system and practices: the role of domestic
* Professor of Law, Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy, Hitotsubashi
University Tokyo, Japan; Advisor, Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu. This article is based on a
presentation made at a conference entitled "Symposium on Capital Markets and the Law in
Japan: Legal Reform and Corporate Governance," which was held at the University of
California, Hastings College of Law, San Francisco, on October 18, 2013. I thank the sponsors of
the conference, the Japan Society of Northern California and the University of California,
Hastings College of Law, Eric Sibbett, Esq. for acting as commentator following my
presentation at the conference, and conference participants for comments.
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institutional investors, the development of a standardized hybrid
model, and the adjustment of Japanese corporate governance to the
demands of globalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
From a foreign investor's perspective, Japan may appear to be
stuck in an unresponsive corporate governance system that favors
employees over shareholders and has poor monitoring of
management. This view of an "unchanging" Japan is symbolized by
the largely fruitless debate during the past fifteen years over whether
to establish a legal requirement for one outside/independent director1
at Japanese listed companies. - Japan's failure to do so marks it as an
1. In this article, an "outside director" refers simply to directors who are not executives or
employees of the corporation. "Independent directors" refers to outside directors who
additionally have no material relationship with the corporation as measured by the relevant
independence standard. Such standards typically exclude individuals in certain categories. The
standard of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE") enumerates five categories of individuals who
would generally not be independent, such as business managers, individuals from major clients,
outside professionals whose organizations are major clients, major shareholders, and close
relatives. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., ENFORCEMENT RULES FOR SECURITIES LISTING
REGULATIONS (2013), available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/about/rules/b7gje600000044tu-
att/securities listinw enforcement rules.pdf.
2. Beginning in 2010, at least one of the outside company auditors (kansayaku) or outside
directors had to satisfy the definition of independence under TSE listing standards. The
requirement for each listed company to have at least one independent director or company
auditor was promulgated on December 30, 2009 as an amendment to the TSE's listing
regulations. The rule calls for each listed company to have one outside director or outside
company auditor (as defined in the Companies Act) "who is unlikely to have conflicts of
interest with general investors." TOKYO STOCK EXCH., ENFORCEMENT RULES FOR SECURITIES
LISTING REGULATIONS (2013), available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/about/rules/b7gje60
0000044tu-att/ securities listing regulations_2013-07-17.pdf. In August 2012, a Subcommittee at
the Ministry of Justice in charge of proposing amendments to the Companies Act adopted a
form of a "comply or explain provision," which would require a reporting company without any
outside directors to explain its reason for the lack of outside directors. In an additional
supplementary resolution, the Subcommittee also recommended that the TSE adopt a rule
requiring at least one independent director for all listed companies. See THE MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, Homusho, MINJIKYOKU, SANJI KANSHITSU [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CIVIL AFFAIRS
BUREAU, COUNCILORS' OFFICE], KAISHA HoSEI No MINAOSHI NI KAN SURU YOKOAN
[DRAFT OUTLINE OF AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPANIES ACT] (2012), available at
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000100819.pdf. The accompanying resolution is referenced in a
new TSE listing. Atsushi Saito, Statement bY President and CEO in Response to the Draft
Outline of Amendments the Companies Act, TOKYO STOCK EXCH. (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/news/09/20120801a.html. These recommendations were
subsequently incorporated into a bill to amend the Companies Act, which was formally
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outlier among Asian countries.3 This seeming unwillingness to
consider change comes despite both recurring corporate governance
scandals such as the recent Olympus case4 and generally poor
performance by Japanese companies, as reflected in common
measures such as return on equity.5
However, this critical viewpoint is incomplete in three respects.
First, it is based on universal applicability and acceptance of a U.S. or
"Anglo-Saxon" model of corporate governance and the experiences
and assumptions that underlie such a model. Second, functional
comparisons with the U.S. are complicated by a lack of data and
understanding of the actual working of a number of important
features of Japanese corporate governance, such as the role fulfilled
by internal company auditors (kansayaku).6 Third and most
submitted to the Japanese Diet (parliament) on November 29, 2013, and passed by the Diet on
June 20, 2014. See THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.moj.go.jp/hisho/
kouhou/hisho06 0(P28.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). See, e.g., ANDREW WHAN ET AL.,
CLIFFORD CHANCE, COMPANIES ACT REFORM: SUPERVISORY FUNCTION OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, available at http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2014/07/companies act
reformsupervisoryfunctiono.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
3. See generaly ASIAN CORP. GOVERNANCE ASS'N, WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN (2008), available at http://-ww.acga-asia.org/public/files/
Japan 20WP 20May2008.pdf. [hereinafter ACGA WHITE PAPER] (noting that Japan is the only
major market in Asia that does not require a minimum number of independent directors and an
audit committee).
4. See generallr Bruce E. Aronson, The Olimpus Scandal and Corporate Governance
Reform: Can Japan Find a Aiddle Ground Between the Board lonitoring Mlodel and
lanagement lodel?, 30 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 93 (2012).
5. Although return on equity, or ROE, is a widely used measure for shareholder return, it
has historically not been important in Japan. Japanese managers tend to be risk-averse and
hoard cash to ensure the survival of their company and reassure stakeholders such as
employees, rather than invest cash to produce income for shareholders or return excess cash
directly to shareholders. See Anna Kitanaka & Toshiro Hasegawa, Japan Tries to Alter the
Mtarket's DNA, BUSJNESSWEEK, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-
30/japan-uses-new-stock-market-index-to-put-companies-focus-on-roe. Average ROE for
Japanese companies during the period 2003-2013 was six percent for Japanese companies and
12.6 percent for companies worldwide. Id. A frequently cited generalization is that ROE for
Japanese companies is roughly half that of U.S. and European companies (i.e., eight percent vs.
fifteen percent). See, e.g., Japanese Stock larkets Have the Potential to Double through the
Improvement of ROE, SPARX ASSET MANAGEMENT CO. (Feb. 2014), http://www.sparx
group.jp/sparxview/Japanese20Stock20Markets20Have20the20Potential 20to20Double20throug
h20the2Olmprovement20of2oROE.pdf. However, a new emphasis on ROE through a new stock
index created by the TSE, investment policies by Japan's largest pension fund, and other factors
may provide stronger incentives for Japanese management to reconsider their policies regarding
the use of investment funds. Id.
6. There is no universally accepted English translation of kansavaku. This article uses
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importantly, a number of leading Japanese companies are responding
to changing business conditions and demands for corporate
governance reform in interesting and imaginative ways that are not
yet reflected in legal requirements applicable to listed Japanese
companies.
This article seeks to achieve a more nuanced and balanced view
of Japanese corporate governance and its reform by discussing and
supplementing, where possible, the three shortcomings noted above.
In particular, I focus on the issue of changing corporate governance
practices at leading Japanese companies that have been active in
addressing basic corporate governance issues, such as the function of
the board of directors.
This article is divided into four sections. The first section
discusses the questions of the appropriate standard for comparing
U.S. and Japanese corporate governance systems, differing
backgrounds and goals of the two systems, and the fundamental
issues of Japanese corporate governance. The second section
discusses our lack of data on some important Japanese corporate
governance practices, with a particular focus on the role of
kansayaku. The third section explores experimentation at leading
individual Japanese companies to address monitoring and other
fundamental issues of corporate governance in Japan, as well as the
possible emergence of a "hybrid" system of governance. The fourth
section identifies and briefly discusses three key issues-the role of
domestic institutional investors, the development of a standardized
hybrid model, and the adjustment of Japanese corporate governance
to the demands of globalization -that may be critical in influencing
the future direction of Japan's corporate governance system and
practices.
The article concludes that the popular critical view of corporate
"company auditor" since that is the term utilized in Japan's Companies Act in a translation
project sponsored by the Ministry of Justice. English translations of rules and reports on the
TSE use the term -statutory auditor," and the industry association of kansaiaku changed its
recommended translation in 2012 from "corporate auditor" to "audit & supervisory board
member." THE JAPAN CORP. AuDITORS ASS'N, NEW RECOMMENDED ENGLISH TRANSLATION
FOR "KANSAYAKU" AND "KANSAYAKU-KAI" (2012), available at
http://www.kansa.or.jp/en/nsl2 1(P3.pdf (no English term fully or accurately describes their
function without further explanation).
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governance in Japan, which is based on the overall lack of progress on
highly visible issues such as a requirement for outside directors, fails
to capture significant reform and evolution in governance practices.
Traditional, large Japanese companies have been at the forefront of
experimentation with a hybrid model in response to both corporate
governance issues and changing business necessities. To date,
however, there is no corporate governance code or other means of
spreading these new best practices more widely among Japanese
companies. The future direction and progress of corporate
governance reform may depend on the three key issues discussed in
the fourth section: the role of domestic institutional investors, the
development of a standardized hybrid model, and the adjustment of
Japanese corporate governance to the demands of globalization.
II. FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF JAPANESE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A. STANDARD OF COMWARISON FOR THE U.S. AND JAPAN
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that the board of
directors in every corporate governance system has two somewhat
contradictory functions: advising management and monitoring
management. The corporate governance model in the U.S. has
evolved to a monitoring model where that function is strong but the
role of providing advice to management is relatively weak.7 In Japan
and many other countries with stakeholder systems, the board tends
to focus more on management issues at the expense of the monitoring
function. 8 It is therefore an unsurprising result that from a
comparative perspective, the most fundamental issue facing Japanese
corporate governance may be characterized as how to build on the
existing system in a realistic way to strengthen the monitoring
function. 9
Although the above comparison may seem relatively
straightforward, it has proven difficult to find a consistent standard
7. See discussion infra notes 18, 20, and accompanying text.
8. See discussion infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
9. See -eneralh-ACGA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3.
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for comparison of Japan and the U.S. Past efforts at analysis of Japan
have also been hampered by our exaggerated views of Japan's
dramatic or "unique" success through the 1980s followed by an
equally extreme view of subsequent failure, and a long-standing
emphasis on cultural explanations with a corresponding view that
"law doesn't matter."10
This problem with comparisons has been pronounced in the field
of comparative corporate governance. The field began in the early
1990s as American scholars sought to study the secrets of Japan's
success. 1 A decade later, the overwhelming theme of comparative
corporate governance literature was the nearly opposite idea of
convergence, i.e., that globalization and competition would result in
systems in industrialized countries converging to approximate an
American corporate governance system that was now seen as the
global standard.)' Japan was now criticized for not effecting a
transformation to a shareholder-oriented system that resembled the
then successful U.S. model.1 3
Following the 2008 financial crisis, we have an opportunity to
provide a more dispassionate and nuanced analysis of the functioning
and evolution of Japanese corporate governance. In Japan, the U.S.
10. See Bruce F. Aronson, Alv KeY Phrase for Understandi Japanese Lawt: Japan as a
Normal Countrv ... fnith Context, 22 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REV. 815, 818-20 (2014).
11. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 10, 45 (1991) (developing a theory of path dependence that emphasized how political and
historic factors kept corporate governance systems on separate paths, in part to explain why
(unlike in Japan or Germany) powerful financial institutions did not play a significant role in
U.S. corporate governance). Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Keiretsu.
Overlaps Between Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 874 (1993)
(attributing Japan's "success" in corporate governance to embedding good governance practices
into its industrial structure in the supposed absence of developed legal mechanisms).
12. See Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of Historvfor Corporate Laif, 89
GEo. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (advocating convergence).
13. Based partly on an assumption of convergence and partly on holding Japan to its own
free market, reformist rhetoric Japanese law specialists also looked for a transformation in
Japanese corporate governance from a stakeholder-based system to a shareholder-based
system. For one of the best studies to measure change based on a criteria of increased emphasis
on maximization of shareholder wealth, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese
Corporate Governance Reform?:. What's Changed, What Hasn 't, and KVi (Columbia Law Sch.
Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 234, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-442960. The same result was also reached from a broader
perspective. See John 0. Haley, Heisei Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal Reforms
Really Changing Japan? (Washington Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law, Faculty Working Papers
Series No. 05-10-0, 2005), available atpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-8-5689.
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model of corporate governance is no longer viewed as the exclusive
global standard.1 4 Although still influential, the U.S. model has been
largely replaced by a multi-polar view. Over the last few years,
English law influence in the field of corporate governance has
become prominent. This is reflected, for example, in a new comply or
explain approach to the requirement for one outside director, 5 in the
recent enactment at the Financial Services Agency ("FSA") of a
Stewardship Code that focuses on the role of asset managers and
other financial intermediaries in engaging with portfolio companies
on behalf of their investors or beneficiaries, 6 and in a recently
initiated process to draft a new corporate governance code. 17
14. I have argued in the past that the English approach that focuses more on soft law
governance codes and enforcement through a comply or explain mechanism may be a better fit
for Japan than the American hard law approach as exemplified by Sarbanes-Oxley. See Bruce
E. Aronson, Hbat Can Wie Learn from US. Corporate Governance? A Critical Analisis, 2 U.
TOKYO J.L. & POL. 41, 56 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id-920865.
15. See supra note 2.
16. See FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
(JAPAN'S STEWARDSHIP CODE) (2013), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/pub/Ol.pdf (a
draft of the code in English). The Stewardship Code was finalized on Feb. 26, 2014. See also
Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors, JAPAN'S STEWARDSHIP CODE (Feb. 26,
2014), http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20140407/01.pdf (the final text in
English). As of September 2, 2014, 160 institutional investors (both domestic and foreign
entities) have notified the FSA of the acceptance of Japan's Stewardship code. See Ste wardship
Code: 160 intuitional investors have signed up to the Principles for Responsible Institutional
In vestors, FINANCIAL SERS. AGENCY, available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship /20140908.html (last updated Sept. 8, 2014).
17. As part of the "third arrow" of structural reform under Abenomics, Japan's ruling
Liberal Democratic Party has begun advocating for a new corporate governance code that is
also based on the English approach. See Tom Redmond et al., Abe Rewrrites Rules to Rouse
Japan ifith Governance Revamp, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 10, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-04-09/abe-rewrites-rules-to-rouse-japan-with-governance-revamp.html. This is an
approach that has been advocated by foreign investors. See Implement a Corporate
Governance Code to Encourage Listed Companies in Japan to Adopt Best Practices and
Uniform Disclosure, THE AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN JAPAN (Apr. 2014), http://www.
accj.or.jp/images/140422-Corporate-GovernanceFDI.pdf: see also Corporate Governance in
Japan: A Revolution in the Alaking, THE ECONOMIST, May 3, 2014, available at http://ww.
economist.com/news/business/21601557-long-last-j apanese-firms-seem-be-coming-under-proper
-outside-scrutiny-revolution. Japan's FSA and the TSE initiated a joint Council of Experts on
Corporate Governance Code in Aug. 2014 to prepare Japan's first corporate governance code
within a year. See, e.g., Kosake Narioka, Japan Seeks to Lure Investors irith Improved
Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/japan-seeks-
to-lure-investors-with-improved-corporate-governance-1403848454. For the Council of Experts
work to date (primarily in Japanese), see the FSA's website. The Experts Aleeting on the
Development of Corporate Governance Code, FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, http://www.fsa.go.jp/
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B. DIFFERENT HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES, SYSTEMS,
AND GOALS
Although we frequently contrast the U.S. and Japan as having a
shareholder-oriented system with a monitoring board versus a
stakeholder-oriented system with a management board, both systems
have evolved over time. Evolution in the U.S. from a business
advisory board to a supervisory board was prompted by concerns
over actual and potential conflicts of interest between management
and shareholders. 8 Such concerns were highlighted by the hostile
M&A boom in the 1980s and by Delaware court decisions that
emphasized the role of independent directors in dealing with these
conflicts. The rise of activist institutional investors in the 1990s
provided additional emphasis on board independence and the
protection of shareholder interests. 9 The monitoring model, with its
emphasis on the role of independent directors, also provided benefits
to management: defenses against takeovers became widespread and
management compensation steadily increased. 20
Our image of corporate governance in Japan reflects the
successful postwar model, in which the main bank and a cross-
shareholding system both supported management's informal promise
of lifetime employment and provided contingent monitoring that
intervened if the company became financially distressed. 2 However,
since this system did not exist in prewar Japan, questions remain as to
how widespread and effective this model was in practice even during
the heyday of postwar Japan. The institutions supporting such a
singi/corporategovernance/siryou/20140904.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
18. See generalli Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1902000:
Mlajor Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349 (2000) (for a general discussion of
this evolution of corporate governance); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors
in the United States, 1950-200: Of Shareholder Value and Stock larket Prices, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1465 (2007) (with respect to the history of the rise of the monitoring model).
19. Gordon, supra note 18.
20. See generalli Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble uith Boards, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010) (arguing that the
monitoring board model provides the strongest liability shield for directors and leaves actual
power with management).
21. See MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY: COMPETITIVENESS IN JAPAN, THE USA, AND THE TRANSITIONAL
ECONOMIES (Stacy Jehlik trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
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system have greatly declined. -
Nevertheless, there has been a relatively consistent preference by
Japanese businesses for an active insider-oriented board. The primary
purpose of current corporate governance reform in Japan might best
be described as improving business competitiveness and performance
to provide value to stakeholders, 3 with a secondary goal of
mandating protection of shareholder interests as necessary to provide
a counterbalance to increased management discretion. Japan has had
no M&A boom, no significant activism by domestic institutional
investors, and no court cases that raise strong concerns about
potential conflicts of interest and that would require, or provide
substantial practical benefits for, the introduction of a substantial
number of independent directorsY5 Reflecting the Japanese priority
on business performance, both critics and supporters of Japan's
efforts at corporate governance reform have characterized two-thirds
of reform measures since 1996 as "pro-management" and one-third as"pro -shareholder. ,,26
22. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Alain Bank Sistem and Other
Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 425 (20(P-).
23. In corporate governance reports to the TSE, the goals cited by a majority of listed
companies were transparency (69.1 percent), stakeholders (60.0 percent), and corporate value
(53.3 percent). TOKYO STOCK EXCH., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2013), available at http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/w-hite-paper/b7gje6OOOOOO5obl-
att/b7gje6000003uk m8.pdf [hereinafter TSE WHITE PAPER].
The least cited among the twelve listed goals was shareholder value (6.6 percent);
monitoring and supervision was cited by 36.6 percent. Id. I suspect many Japanese businessmen
take the view that in a stakeholder system the oft-cited goal of enhancing corporate value refers
to enhancing value for all stakeholders. For example, one commentator explains that enhancing
corporate value is a two-step process involving (1) expanding the corporate "pie" of future
earnings and (2) equitably dividing the pie among stakeholders. Kazuhiro Takei, "Kansa Iinkai
Setchi Gaisha "no Kaikin [Removal of Prohibition on "Company with Audit Committee"], 1900
SHOJIHOMU 13, 13 (2010).
24. The one notable activist institutional investor in Japan during the 2000s was the Pension
Fund Association. However, it effectively withdrew from that activity in 2010. See generally
Sanford M. Jacoby, Convergence b Design: The Case of CalPERS in Japan, 55 AM. J. COMP.
L. 239 (2007); see also Bruce E. Aronson, A Japanese CalPERS or a New lodel for
Institutional Investor Activism? Japan 's Pension Fund Association and the Emergence of
Shareholder Activism in Japan, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 571 (2011).
25. A Japanese Supreme Court decision in 2009 on a management buyout case illustrates
both the potential for serious conflicts of interest in Japan and the uncertainty in how to address
such conflicts. See In re Rex Holdings Co., Ltd., 1326 KINYU HANREI 35 (2009), translated in
BUSINESS LAW IN JAPAN-CASES AND COMMENTS. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CIVIL,
COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 299 (Moritz Balz et al., eds., 2012).
26. See Milhaupt, supra note 13 (stating that about two-thirds of the changes were
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The corporate governance purpose in Japan of improving
business' competitiveness to add corporate value, as opposed to the
U.S. emphasis on dealing with potential conflicts of interest, has
serious practical consequences. The Japanese approach highlights the
long-standing issue of the relationship between corporate governance
and business performance. The lack of proof of a clear and consistent
correlation has been an important factor in the resistance of Japanese
business organizations, such as Nippon Keidanren, to requirements
for a minimum number of outside directors and to the lack of overall
progress in new legal requirements for Japanese corporate
governance.
Different historical experiences, expectations, and institutions in
Japan and the U.S. all contribute to the question that most puzzles
foreign institutional investors in Japan: Why are Japanese companies
often considered unresponsive to foreign shareholders despite the
substantial share of the Japanese market now held by such
international investors? 28
The answer to this question reflects the lack of a new model or
management-friendly "flexibility enhancing amendments" and about one-third were
shareholder-friendly "monitoring enhancing amendments"). See also ZENICHI SHISHIDO,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL
DIVERSITY 310, 313-14 (Masahiko Aoki et al., eds., 2007) (characterizing the majority of
changes as "demand-pull" reforms requested by business and a minority as "policy-push"
reforms to protect shareholders).
27. Most of the empirical research in the U.S. has found no correlation between improved
business performance and good corporate governance measures like a greater number of
independent directors. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, Non-Correlation Between
Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002). It should be
noted that research in the U.S. has focused more on the question of the value provided by a
supermajority of independent directors. However, business groups in Japan further use this
argument to oppose a requirement for ani outside directors. Some Japanese commentators
have highlighted recent empirical research by Takuji Saito that does find a correlation between
the addition of the first outside director into an all-insider Japanese board and improvements in
operating performance and firm value. See TAKUJI SAITO, FACULTY OF ECON., OKAYAMA
UNIV., PRESENCE OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS, BOARD EFFECTIVENESS AND FIRM
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN (2009), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/
zanran storage/www.e.okayama-u.ac.jp/ContentPages/47804533.pdf (in English). See also
Aronson, supra note 4, at 122-25 and accompanying text; Bruce E. Aronson, Corporate
Governance Mlodels and Practices in Japan and East Asia: Proceedings of a Panel Discussion,
27 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2395059 (for
citations to similar research in Korea).
28. In Japan the share of the equity market held by foreign investors has increased from
under five percent in 1990 to twenty eight percent in 2012. See infra Table 1.
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generally accepted paradigm for Japanese corporate governance
despite the marked weakening of the Japanese postwar model.
Although the system of lifetime employment has substantially
declined, one often continues to encounter an attitude by Japanese
managers that core employees (and perhaps friendly "stable"
shareholders) are the "real" long-term stakeholders while
shareholders who are motivated by financial return on investment are
mere short-term investors. 9 The cross-shareholding system, although
substantially weakened, still provides support for company
management.30 Individual shareholders tend to be apathetic and
support management. Most significantly, domestic institutional
shareholders in Japan have been complacent, despite poor corporate
performance by portfolio companies. This often creates a situation of
"Japanese versus foreigners" in which managers of Japanese
companies can successfully portray themselves to both shareholders
and the Japanese media as defenders of Japanese tradition against
greedy, profit-oriented foreigners who care nothing about the
company's employees or Japanese society.31
29. The distinction is often phrased as "shareholders" versus "investors," with an implied
greater distinction between those two groups than is commonly assumed in the U.S.
30. The biggest decline has occurred in bank shareholdings in friendly companies; cross-
shareholding by business corporations has also declined, but not as dramatically. See infra Table
1. Thus, cross-shareholding may still aid management at some Japanese companies. In
particular, activist funds tend to target small and medium-sized companies, rather than large
corporations, and cross-shareholding remains more prevalent at smaller companies. See Gen
Goto, Legalli Strong Shareholders of Japan, 21 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L.
125,126-28 (2014).
31. The most famous attempt at a hostile takeover of a Japanese company by a foreign
entity, Steel Partners LLC's bid for Bulldog Sauce Co., Ltd., is often cited as clear evidence of
the hostility to foreign takeovers and the lack of a market for corporate control in Japan. In that
case the company's issuance of warrants as part of a poison pill defense that was approved by a
large majority of shareholders was upheld by Japan's Supreme Court. See Bulldog Sauce Case,
Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 7, 2007, (kyo) no. 30, SAIKO SAIBANSHO HANREISHU
[MINSHU] 1809, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2007.08.07-2O007.-
Kyo-.No.30.html (Japan). For comments on the case, see, e.g., Nels Hansen, Japan s First
Poison Pill Case: Bulldog Sauce v. Steel Partners: A Comparative and Institutional Analisis, 26
J. JAPANESE L. 139 (2008); David Alan Makman, Changes in Corporate Governance are
Having an Effect in Japan, THE NAT'L. L.J., Sep. 1, 2008, available at http://makman
matz.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Changes-in-Corporate-Governance.pdf. Even more than
the Supreme Court's decision, foreign shareholders took special note of the prior Tokyo High
Court decision which labeled Steel Partners as an "abusive acquirer." See Hansen, supra note
31. Individual shareholders of Bulldog Sauce also apparently voted overwhelmingly in favor of
management's poison pill despite it being against their economic interest, i.e., management
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C. FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
There are two basic issues of board structure that appear to be
fundamental for Japanese corporate governance and its reform. The
first issue is whether the board of directors sufficiently fulfills its
monitoring function. The second issue is the closely related question
of whether the Japanese kansayaku serve as a reasonable substitute
for independent directors to fulfill this role.
The question of whether to create a legal requirement for a
minimum number of independent directors has dominated the debate
over Japanese corporate governance for over a decade. The argument
for such a requirement is often based on the assumption, generally
held by foreign institutional investors, that Japan's kansayaku are
unable to effectively fulfill a monitoring role.3 Kansayaku are
criticized as lacking authority since they have no vote at board
meetings and cannot hire or fire the CEO or directors.33 They may be
relatively effective on compliance matters such as scrutinizing
proposed transactions for accounting or legal issues.34 They are often
characterized as being weaker, however, in the important areas that
have not been emphasized in Japan to date like handling conflicts of
interest and monitoring top management.35
In addition, all sides in the debate over requiring outside
directors in Japan agree that simply adding an outside director to the
existing board structure is likely to have limited impact on corporate
decision-making or monitoring of management.36 It is also necessary
to provide such outside directors or other monitors of management
with the necessary environment and means to fulfill their role and
ensure an actual strengthening of the board monitoring function.3
bought out Steel Partners' shares at a substantial premium to market (a kind of "legal
greenmail") and this repurchase essentially occurred at the expense of general shareholders. See
Goto, supra note 30, at 17.
32. ACGA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 18.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 27, at 244-45.
35. Id.
36. See generall Nippon Keidanren, Towards Better Corporate Governance, KEIDANREN
(Apr. 14, 2009), http://ww.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2009/038.pdf; ACGA WHITE PAPER,
supra note 3, at 19-20.
37. Following the Olympus scandal, the TSE made a new, if modest, proposal with the
stated goal of "fortifying the environment to facilitate independent board member functions."
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Such an environment would include providing sufficient access to
information, greater litigation risk, or some other incentive to
encourage monitors to raise issues that may challenge the views of
corporate management and additional outside monitors, such as
professional service providers functioning as gatekeepers.38
The second fundamental issue is the failure at many Japanese
companies to separate the board's management and monitoring
functions, as many Japanese boards meet frequently and remain
involved in actively managing the day-to-day business of the
company.39 This can result in Japanese directors having a fiduciary
duty to monitor themselves as managers of the business, which
naturally tends to weaken the board oversight function.
A specific issue related to the above two fundamental questions
is the role of the president in Japanese companies and, in particular,
their power of appointment.40  The president in a Japanese
corporation often has unchallenged power (although no formal legal
authority) over top-level personnel appointments, including his
successor as president, directors, and kansayaku.41 In addition, once a
president leaves his post, it is not unusual for such an individual to
linger as a consultant or adviser for many years. This raises the issue
of the actual influence of such an ex-president, who at that time has
no legal or formal authority whatsoever, on his hand-picked successor
president and on company policies and practices.4- Any such
influence is completely opaque and presents a significant corporate
governance issue.
See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., REVISIONS TO LISTING RULES REGARDING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITIES MARKET 3 (2012), available at
http://www.tse.or.jp/ english/news/09/b7gje6000000wkw4-att/20120302_a.pdf.
38. See Aronson, supra note 4, at 129-39.
39. See id. at 125-27.
40. See id. at 127-29.
41. By law, a company's president has no formal role in the selection of his successor or
directors other than his one vote as a director on the board to elect a representative director
(generally equivalent to president). Directors are formally elected by shareholders at the annual
general meeting of shareholders. See Companies Act, Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 329, para. I
(Japan).
42. See Sumitaka Fujita, President of Japan CFO Ass'n and Sosuke Uno, Esq., Partner,
Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu, Remarks at The Board Director Training Institute of Japan
and Hitotsubashi ICS Joint Seminar: Comparing Audit Committees to Kansayaku Boards (Mar.
6,2014).
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The president's power of appointment is also an important
corporate governance issue because of its potential impact on the
actual independence of any monitor of management under the
Japanese system. Much of the debate in Japan focuses on whether
outside directors or kansayaku can act as a more effective monitor
and contrasts their roles. However, if both kansayaku and outside
directors are effectively appointed by the president, they in fact share
the risk that they may lack real independence.
The continuing questions revolving around these fundamental
issues do not mean that there has been no overall change or progress
in Japanese corporate governance. It would be fair to say that Japan,
being somewhat skeptical of the role of corporate governance in
business performance and in the efficacy of "one size fits all" legal
requirements, has focused primarily on increasing public information
43disclosure and transparency. In addition, there has been some
strengthening of fiduciary duties by incorporating a clear
responsibility for oversight of internal controls. 44 There have also
been some useful voluntary structural changes such as a significant
reduction in board size, with a corresponding increase in importance
of officers who do not serve on the board of directors. 4' Nevertheless,
there is a question as to whether Japan should be taking more
dramatic measures in light of overall poor business performance,
demands of foreign shareholders in a globalizing capital market, and
repeated scandals such as in the Olympus case.
III. WHAT DO WE (NOT) KNOW ABOUT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN JAPAN'?
Debates on corporate governance issues are frequently
unsatisfying due to a lack of sufficient data on relevant practices. It is
43. Such efforts include an overhaul of Japan's securities law in the mid-2000s for the
purpose, inter alia, of improving information disclosure. See Kinyu Shohin Torihiki Ho [The
Financial Instruments and Exchange Act], Law No. 65 of 2006 (Japan).
44. The board of directors must create an overall policy for internal controls and this
responsibility may not be delegated. See Companies Act, Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 362, para. 5
(Japan).
45. For example, the average size of the board of directors of listed companies has
gradually declined to 8.13 persons in 2013. TSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 23, at 22.
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very difficult to compare actual practices in the United States and
Japan due to the difficulty in firmly grasping the reality in either
system. Many of the issues are not subject to easy quantification or
measurement. Much of what we know is through anecdote, with
actual practices likely varying significantly among companies.
For example, boards in the U.S. are now dominated by
independent directors, but are they truly independent'? The definition
of independence focuses on preventing certain material (i.e.,
economic or financial) relationships and does not extend to personal
relationships or other circumstances.46 This problem is essentially
unsolvable, with organizations like the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") stating that the goal is to
have "independently minded" directors.47 Such a goal could not be
achieved by mechanical application of any existing definition. Related
issues would include questions such as whether nomination
committees truly make appointments without any CEO influence and
whether compensation committees operate independently in light of
very generous executive compensation practices.
Discovering and quantifying actual practices is even more
difficult in Japan. For example, there is no data on the common
practice of the "lingering" (ex-)president, including position, length of
term, and, most importantly, the power actually exercised by such
46. See Listed Compan lanual: §303A.02 Independence Test, NEW YORK STOCK EXCH.,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/Help/mapContent.asp?sec-lcm-sections&title-sx-ruling-nyse-
policymanual_303A.02&id-chp-1_4_3_3 (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
47. See, e.g., Corporate Governance Principles. Asian Roundtable on Corporate
Governance, Bangkok Thailand, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. ("OECD")
(Sept. 14-15, 2006), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/asianroundtable
oncorporategovernancebangkokthailand.htm (noting that one topic of discussion was "how to
motivate directors to be 'independent-minded') (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). The OFCD's
corporate governance principles, which must be sufficiently general to apply to a wide variety of
corporate governance systems, merely state that -[b]oards should consider assigning a sufficient
number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent judgment to tasks
where there is a potential for conflicts of interest." OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A
SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES, 89 (2004), available at http://wxw.oecd.org/corporate/ca
/corporategovernanceprinciples/21755678.pdf. With respect to the standard for independence,
the OECD Principles simply note that many countries use solely "negative" criteria to exclude
certain individuals as lacking independence, but encourage the complementary use of .'positive'
examples of qualities that will increase the probability of effective independence." OECD,
PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 64 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org
/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.
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individuals. Although we know that boards in Japan meet often and
tend to approve rather detailed matters of daily management, the
actual standard for matters that require board approval is an internal
standard at each Japanese company. 48 We also have no real data on
meetings of management conferences (kelel kaigi ) that generally
proceed board meetings to help management (i.e., the president)
finalize decisions, despite the potential for such conferences to make
board meetings mere formalities.49
However, our greatest lack of data related to Japanese corporate
governance involves the actual role of kansayaku. This is a great
necessity precisely because of the popular debate about the
effectiveness of kansayaku and whether Japanese corporate
governance would be better served by placing a greater emphasis on
outside directors. As a starting point, I note that the kansayaku
association, Japan Audit & Supervisory Board Members Association
("JASBA"), has some 5,800 largely corporate members and 7,600
registered individuals.50 They represent a powerful force and remain
popular with the bulk of Japanese companies. It is likely unrealistic to
promote any reform program that is based on the abolition of
kansayaku and their replacement with outside directors in the near
future.51 This only increases the need for a better understanding of
their actual function and their current and potential contribution to
corporate governance in Japan.
In fact, we know very little about kansayaku. As an initial matter,
we do not have a clear idea of who they aref The Companies Act
48. As a matter of law, the board must make decisions on four important categories of
business matters, including, for example, the sale or acquisition of "important" (or "significant")
property and any "significant" borrowing. See Companies Act, Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 362,
para. 4, no. ii (Japan). There is no rule or regulation helping to define "significant," and in
practice the minimal amount required for board approval can be relatively small. See, e.g.,
Aronson, supra note 4, at 125 n.135.
49. See, e.-., Aronson, supra note 4, at 131 nn.153-55 and accompanying text.
50. JAPAN AUDIT & SUPERVISORY BD. MEMBERS ASS'N, ASSOCIATION BROCHURE 1
(2014).
51. The recent amendment to Japan's Companies Act also enacted an additional optional
corporate "one committee" structure in which the kansaaku Board of Audit would be
upgraded to an Audit and Supervision Committee of the Board of Directors. See supra note 2.
52. Companies disclose biographical information on kansavaku in their annual securities
filings and proxy voting materials. However, to the best of my knowledge, no one has compiled
and analyzed such data. The TSE includes a question on the relationship between the reporting
company and outside kansaaku in the annual corporate governance reports that are required
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requires that half or more of the kansayaku at large companies must
be outsiders.53 But who are they'? This is an important question, as
their independence, competence, and effectiveness may be influenced
by their background. For example, an "outside" kansayaku
dispatched from a parent company may be quite knowledgeable and
willing to speak out about perceived problems at a subsidiary or
question its management. My impression is that a substantial number
of outside kansayaku come from the company's "main bank."54 They
may be knowledgeable about the company's financial situation and in
a position to monitor financial decisions, but do they have a
sufficiently independent mindset to actually do so'?
In addition to the basic question of who are kansayaku, we are
also uncertain as to what they do. This should be a critical issue in the
ongoing debate about the effectiveness of kansayaku and comparing
their function to that of outside directors. As noted above, the most
common comment about kansayaku from global institutional
investors is that they attend, but have no right to vote at, board
meetings and also cannot fire the company president.5 However, it is
a popular anecdote among large Japanese companies with good
corporate governance that a negative comment by a kansayaku at a
board meeting does, in fact, prevent a company from proceeding with
a proposal.5 6 Further, according to this view, company management
does not, in their own mind, distinguish clearly between the roles of
outside kansayaku and outside directors, as both groups question a
of listed companies. Such data are useful in that, for example, they show that 4.6 percent of
outside kansavaku at listed companies are from parent companies and 5.9 percent are from
"other affiliated companies," and that both categories are declining. TSE WHITE PAPER, supra
note 23, at 40-41. However, the other multiple choice categories provided to describe this
relationship are quite broad, such as "outside director of other company" or "executive of other
company," and do not indicate, for example, whether an outside kansavaku comes from a "main
bank" or any bank. Id. at 40.
53. Companies Act, Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 335, para. 3 (Japan) (a board of auditors must
contain a minimum of three auditors).
54. This is my impression both from JASBA gatherings I have attended and from remarks
of the chairman of JASBA. See Junji Ota, Chairman, JASBA, Panel Discussion at Japan CFO
Ass'n, 13th CFO Forum Japan: Considering Japan's Corporate Governance (Dec. 5, 2013)
(noting that kansayaku as a group could also utilize the expertise and knowledge of the main
banks of Japanese companies in performing their function).
55. See ACGA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 18.
56. Kazuhiko Ishimura, President & CEO, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd., Remarks at Japan CFO
Ass'n, 13th CFO Forum Japan (Dec. 5, 2013).
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variety of management proposals and practices. 7 But even if this is
true for some companies, how many'?
There is some hope that this situation of unfruitful formal
debates based on limited knowledge of actual practices will improve.
Over the past two years, JASBA has begun to make greater efforts to
explain the role of kansayaku, including producing materials in
English on its website.5 8 In 2013, JASBA conducted an initial, partial
survey of members that contains glimpses of a possible broader role
for some kansayaku 9 This may lead to additional surveys that are
more complete and useful. At the same time, the Asian Corporate
Governance Association ("ACGA") produced a new report on the
role of kansayaku in Japan in October 2013 that is a more balanced
effort to compare the actual function of kansayaku with that of
independent directors.60
There may also be additional useful areas for research. For
example, some knowledgeable observers believe that we may need to
broaden our analysis to go beyond a narrow comparison of the roles
of outside kansayaku and outside directors to focus on the key issue
of the overall investment in personnel and resources for risk
management at American and Japanese companies. 61 According to
this view, it is the relative lack of overall investment by Japanese
companies in risk management personnel and systems in business
units, rather than the role of kansayaku, that represents a significant
weakness in Japanese corporate governance. 6-
57. On the other hand, as noted earlier, both outside kansavaku and outside directors in
Japan also potentially share a common fundamental problem relating to their independence due
to their both typically being selected by the company president. See Ishimura, supra note 56.
58. See .eneralli JAPAN AUDIT & SUPERVISORY BD. MEMBERS ASS'N (JASBA),
http://www.kansa.or.jp/en/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
59. Dai 77 Kai Kansaiaku Zenkoku Kaigs Ni Kakaru fizen Ankeeto: Shukei Kekka
[Advance Questionnaire For The 77 Kansayaku National Conference: Aggregate Results],
JAPAN AUDIT & SUPERVISORY BD. MEMBERS ASS'N ("JASBA") (2013), http://www.
kansa.or.jp/support/library/secretariat/post-109.html (in Japanese only).
60. Charles Lee & Jamie Allen, The Roles and Functions of Kansaiaku Boards Compared
to Audit Committees, ASIAN CORP. Gov. ASS'N (Oct. 2013), http://www.acga-asia.org/
public/files/ACGAPaperKansayakuAuditCommitteesOctober _2013_EnglishFinal.pdf.
61. Supra note 42.
62. Id.
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IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AT LEADING
JAPANESE CORPORATIONS: THE EMERGENCE OF A
HYBRID FORM OF GOVERNANCE
A. BOARD STRUCTURE AND CHANGING PRACTICES
In the absence of detailed data on practices, it would be tempting
to classify corporate governance at Japanese corporations in
accordance with formal board structures. Since 2003, Japanese
companies have a choice of corporate structures: their traditional
"company with auditors" structure, which has no required outside
directors and instead utilizes kansayaku to monitor management, and
a new, alternative "American-style" "company with committees"
structure that requires a majority of outside directors on each of three
required board committees (audit, compensation, and nomination
committees) in place of the kansayaku.63
An overwhelming majority (some ninety-eight pecent) of
Japanese companies have elected to retain the company with auditors
structure,64 and this is often cited as a strong indicator of the
unwillingness of Japanese companies to reform corporate governance
practices. However, it is in the traditional companies where
interesting reforms are occurring. This is often described as the recent
emergence of a "mixed" or hybrid system in which traditional
Japanese companies voluntarily add a number of outside directors in
an effort to combine insiders' information with outsiders'
independence to achieve more effective board functioning.65
In addition, many "Japanese-style" practices and reforms are
similar at leading companies regardless of whether the formal
corporate structure is one of a company with auditors or a company
with committees. These corporate governance practices include,
among others, greater separation of the management and supervisory
roles of the board of directors. Japanese businessmen at leading
companies often see greater similarities, rather than differences, in
63. See -enerallv Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Re gulatorv Reform:
The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. CoMP. L. 343 (2005).
64. As of 2013, only 2.2 percent of listed companies had adopted the optional company with
committees structure. TSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 23, at 15.
65. See infra Figure 1.
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emerging corporate governance practices at leading companies
regardless of their formal board structure.66
B. CAUSES OF CHANGE AT LEADING JAPANESE COMPANIES
Substantial changes at leading Japanese companies result from a
combination of factors: loss of support of institutions underlying the
postwar system such as a decline in cross-shareholding and stable
shareholders, a corresponding increase in foreign shareholders with
demands for corporate governance reform, and business necessity, as
major Japanese corporations become larger, more complicated, and
more global.
The loss of friendly, stable shareholders is the important factor
that is easiest to measure (See Table 1 in appendix). Shareholdings of
listed companies by main banks (i.e., city and regional banks)
declined from a steady fifteen percent during the 1990s to an
insignificant level today. They have been replaced by foreign
shareholders, whose share of the stock market has increased from five
percent in 1990 to twenty-eight percent today. Although, as noted
above, while global institutional investors complain that their
influence with management at Japanese companies remains weak
compared to the size of their shareholdings, the long and continuing
decline of the cross-shareholding system is beginning to have an
impact. This is particularly true for major Japanese corporations with
global operations who tend to have a relatively large percentage of
foreign shareholders.67
An important factor that is often overlooked in discussions of
Japanese corporate governance is the business necessity for large
Japanese corporations to reform their governance structure and
processes. As noted above, one significant characteristic of traditional
board functioning at Japanese corporations is the board's close
involvement in day-to-day operations of the company. The matters
they discuss and approve are often relatively small and the result is
66. See generallr Aronson, supra note 4, at 143-45.
67. For example, there is a correlation between a higher ratio of foreign shareholding and a
greater number of outside directors among Japanese listed companies. See TSE WHITE PAPER,
supra note 23, at 24, 26.
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more frequent meetings than at a typical U.S. company.68 Such an
approach becomes increasingly infeasible as Japanese companies
become larger and more international.
One of the major methods Japanese companies have adopted to
address the issue of board function is to utilize the equivalent of
intermediate "holding" companies. Occasionally, this is accomplished
by the use of operating subsidiaries and actual holding companies.
However, this division also often occurs within the same corporation
as major product lines are divided into a number of internal strategic
business units (in Japan, they generally use the English term
"company" to describe such internal business units) (See Figure 1 in
appendix). Most day-to-day decisions are made by each "company"
with respect to its business, and the board of directors of the
corporation deals primarily with capital allocation and other strategic
issues.69 Although pushing down day-to-day decisions from the main
board to a lower level is not directly related to structural corporate
governance issues like the number and role of outside directors, it is
generally large, sophisticated companies that adopt both sets of
measures.
Other common approaches were mentioned above. Nearly all
large Japanese companies have taken voluntary action to significantly
reduce the size of their board from large boards of twenty to forty
directors a few decades ago to an average of 8.13 directors for listed
companies today.70 Partly as a result, a new class of executive officers
(who are not directors) has assumed an increasingly important
managerial role at all large Japanese companies. While this is
essentially required for companies with committees, it has also
occurred voluntarily, even if to a lesser extent, at traditional
companies with auditors.71
68. See supra note 39.
69. See, e.g., supra note 56.
70. See TSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
71. The Companies Act requires that companies with committees have at least one
executive officer (shikkovaku) and one representative officer with authority to represent the
corporation (a role filled in traditional companies with auditors by a representative director who
is chosen from among the directors). See Companies Act, Law No. 86, art. 402, para. 1;
Companies Act, Law No. 86, Art. 420, para. I respectively. There is no provision in the
Companies Act regarding executive officers at companies with auditors.
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C. ONGOING EXPERIMENTATION WITH A HYBRID FORM
The future of Japanese corporate governance may lie in the
development of hybrid systems that are intended to combine the best
elements of the board management and monitoring models. The
specific goal of this hybrid approach is to form a system that combines
the information access of insiders with the independence of outsiders
in a way that results in real board discussion and management
oversight. Japanese businessmen also see functional similarities
between reforms being adopted by individual companies, regardless
of whether by traditional companies with auditors or by "American-
style" companies with committees.72
Although there is no clear definition of a "hybrid" system in
Japan, it typically applies to a traditional company with auditors that
has several independent directors and at least one board committee,
in particular a nomination committee (See Figure 1).' In addition to
these structural features that are not required by law, the role of
kansayaku (which are legally required) also generally functions more
effectively. This includes not only outside kansayaku, but also inside
kansayaku who are thoroughly familiar with corporate affairs, as
outsiders access to information is often cited as the biggest obstacle to
the effective functioning of outside directors (and other potential
monitors such as outside kansayaku) at Japanese companies.
New corporate governance practices are not limited to the
traditional companies with auditors. The small minority of companies
with committees have also modified a number of practices so that
they work more effectively in the Japanese context. As a result, some
practices at companies with committees do not necessarily fit with
Americans' image of how board committees should operate.
The clearest example is the function of the key nomination
72. See Aronson, supra note 4, at 144 n. 212 and accompanying text. Rather than a stark
choice between corporate structure, many Japanese businessmen emphasize similarities in the
practical responses by Japanese companies to corporate governance issues and business
necessities regardless of formal board structure. Id.
73. The Asian Corporate Governance Association, in noting a trend toward hybrid boards
among traditional companies with auditors in Japan, broadly cites companies with one or more
external directors and/or which "are establishing functional board committees." See AGCA
WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 18.
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committee at both types of companies. The nomination committee is
the most commonly cited reason for the unpopularity of the company
with committee structure since it theoretically supplants the
president's prerogative to make high-level personnel appointments.74
Hybrid companies with auditors have established nomination
committees with outsiders for the purpose of screening the
president's preferred choices to ensure they are based on the merits
and not on cronyism (See Figure 1). 71 Such a process subjects the
president's approved candidates to substantive review by outside
directors.
This "Japanese-style" role of the nomination committee may, in
fact, be similar to the actual operation of nomination committees at
"American-style" companies with committees. Such "American-
style" nomination committees reportedly also engage in vetting
candidates chosen by management (the president or chairman) and
generally do not seek to independently identify and screen potential
candidates.76
Both types of companies have also moved to limit the board's
involvement in day-to-day operations. The reason stated most ofted
for the adoption of the company with committee structure is to make
decision-making more efficient, i.e., place officers in charge of day-to-
day management and have the board focus on strategic issues.77 Two
of the best-known examples of companies with committees, Sony and
Toshiba, both began with the creation of executive officers in 1997,
well before the availability of the company with committee structure
in 2003.78 As noted above, some companies with auditors have
achieved similar results by creating intermediate "companies" for
daily decision-making, by shrinking the size of their boards and by
utilizing executive officers (which are neither legally required nor
provided for in the Companies Act for companies with auditors) (See
74. See Aronson, supra note 4, at 127 n. 141.
75. For example, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd., a well-known hybrid, is a company with auditors
that has established a nomination committee and a compensation committee. The nomination
committee currently consists of four directors, composed of the president and three outside
directors. See Figure 1 (the company president does not, "in principle," participate in committee
discussions.).
76. See Aronson supra note 4, at 145 n. 215.
77. See supra note 69.
78. See, e.., Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 63, at 349-50.
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Figure 1).
There is also a commonality concerning the value placed on
insiders with long experience and full access to information combined
with the independence of outsiders. As noted above, for companies
with auditors, this is reflected in the voluntary introduction of several
outside directors and board committees to act as the independent
outsiders. However, many companies with committees have gone in
the other direction and sought to bring insiders onto the board to
interact closely with independent directors. This important role for
nonexecutive directors (i.e., former company executives who have no
current executive position) is now unknown in the U.S. although it is
regularly discussed and utilized in the U.K.7 9 For example, Toshiba
emphasizes an equal division between executive directors and
nonexecutive directors in keeping with the concept of combining
insider expertise and authority with outsiders. 8
The use of nonexecutive directors by companies with committees
often extends to the audit committee. Unlike those in the U.S., audit
committees in Japan generally are not composed entirely of outside
directors, but rather include insiders or nonexecutive directors.>' This
practice reflects the importance of providing insider (or ex-insider)
information and reinforces the impression that Japanese companies
place a value on the role and function of kansayaku (and, in
particular, inside kansayaku) that is not shared or appreciated by
79. For example, Principle A4 of the UK corporate governance code is entitled "non-
executive directors" and independent directors are referred to as "independent non-executive
directors." See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (Sept.
10,2012).
80. At present, Toshiba has eight executive (inside) directors and eight nonexecutive
directors. Among the nonexecutive directors, four are former employees and only the other
four qualify as outside directors. See Corporate Governance, TOSHIBA,
http://www.toshiba.co.jp/csr/en/governance/governance.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). Under
the Companies Act a current or former executive director, executive, officer or employee of a
company or any of its subsidiaries is excluded from the definition of outside director. See
Companies Act, Art. 2, Item 15. Nonexecutive directors are valued as important former (well-
informed) Toshiba officials who are senior to, and can more easily question, the current top
management even though they do not qualify as outside directors under the Companies Act.
See Aronson, supra note 4, at 117 n. 97.
81. For example, two of the three current members of the audit committee of Nomura
Holdings, Inc. are outside directors, while the third member is a nonexecutive director (i.e.,
former employee). See Corporate Governance, NOMURA HOLDINGS, INC., http://www.nomura
holdings.com/investor/cg/committee.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
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global institutional investors.
These developments suggest the potential emergence of a new
model of Japanese corporate governance. Japanese companies that
have adopted a form of the hybrid model report that their corporate
governance practices are readily accepted by global institutional
investors without the skepticism displayed with respect to traditional
Japanese companies.F However, many questions remain unanswered.
The most fundamental issue is trying to judge the extent to which
these new best practices have spread among Japanese companies.
This is difficult to measure and precise data is not available.
One estimate given by a knowledgeable observer portrays a
"Tale of Two Cities" in which practices have diverged between large,
global companies and smaller domestic companies. According to this
view, some ten to twenty percent of Japanese companies have
adopted "good" corporate governance practices. As these are large
companies, they command a significant percentage (seventy percent
to eighty percent) of the market capitalization of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange and are the prominent investment choices for global
institutional investors.83 In this connection, it will be interesting to see
if a new stock index launched in Tokyo at the beginning of 2014 will
be successful in its aim of appealing to global investors and improving
corporate value. Companies included in the new "JPX-Nikkei Index
400" are selected based on quantitative factors such as return on
equity and liquidity and also given quality points for governance
issues.84
The dark side of this story of "A Tale of Two Cities" is that it
leaves a significant number of Japanese companies with corporate
governance and business practices that are both potentially weak at
monitoring management and also not well suited for the international
expansion plans being formulated and implemented by many mid-
82. See, e.g., remarks of K. Ishimura, supra note 56.
83. E-mail to the author from Hiroshi Komori, Associate General Manager, Business
Advisory Department, Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Limited (Dec. 13, 2013) (on file with
author).
84. For the TSE's news release concerning this new index, see Start of Calculation and
Publication of New Index iJPX-Nikkei' Index, TOKYO STOCK EXCH., http://www.tse.or.jp/
english/news/17/131106_b.html (last updated Nov. 6, 2013).
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sized Japanese companies.85 In addition, from a global investors'
perspective, this means that outsiders can invest with confidence in
large Japanese exporters whose fortunes are already tied to the global
economy but have greater difficulty investing in domestically oriented
Japanese companies to achieve diversification of risk.
V. FUTURE DIRECTION IN JAPANESE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Whether these promising recent practices at individual Japanese
companies will coalesce and develop into a new model of Japanese
corporate governance depends on a number of factors. The three
trends I am following closely are briefly discussed below.
A. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
It is difficult to promote the widespread use of corporate
governance improvements in Japan when pressure for reform is
perceived to come primarily from foreign investors. This always
leaves corporate management with the option of playing the gaji
card and acting as the defender of traditional Japanese interests
regardless of whether that is an accurate assessment of management's
behavior. The well-known Bulldog Sauce case is one rather extreme
example of that phenomenon. 6
Even though domestic Japanese institutional investors suffer
from the same generally poor performance of Japanese portfolio
companies as do global institutional investors, there is very little
institutional activism in Japan. Yet, as seen in Table 1, assets held by
asset management companies, particularly trust banks, have been
growing steadily. At the same time, as noted above, the FSA has
promulgated a Stewardship code based on the U.K. model that deals
with the obligations of asset managers to engage with portfolio
companies on behalf of their investors.8
85. See, e.g., JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., FY2013 SURVEY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE FIRMS (2014), available at https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/
releases/20140324533-news/FY2013_SurveyInternational_ Operations ofJapaneseFirms.pdf.
86. See supra note 31.
87. See supra note 16.
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If I had to pick one key issue concerning the future direction of
Japanese corporate governance, it would be the extent to which
Japanese domestic institutional investors step up and more actively
question management of portfolio companies and work to improve
both governance and performance.88
B. DEVELOPMENT OF A HYBRID MODEL
Although there are now many interesting practices at individual
Japanese companies, there is considerable variation among
companies and no clear definition of the nascent hybrid model. One
of the biggest challenges facing Japanese corporate governance in the
near future is to find a way to standardize and spread these best
practices so that a clear standard model emerges. One promising
approach would be to again turn to the U.K. model, i.e., promulgate a
corporate governance code and enforce it through a comply or
explain procedure for listed companies. 89 Such codes have now
become widespread and represent a better fit for Japan than a "one-
size-fits-all" hard law approach taken by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
the United States. Although codes do not provide a panacea and have
their own issues, a corporate governance code, which has been
recommended for Japan by the ACGA, in now being drafted.90
Japan has already initiated a comply or explain approach with
regard to the specific issue of requiring one outside "director" at
listed companies,91 however, Japan's political economy of corporate
governance reform will present a challenge to expansion of the
comply or explain approach to cover an entire corporate governance
88. Japan's Pension Fund Association was widely regarded as the sole activist among
institutional investors during the 2000s. See supra note 24. Currently, the largest asset manager
in Japan (and Asia) is Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Limited,, with assets under management of
$456 billion USD as of June 30, 2013. Symposium, Capital Alarkets and the Lalf in Japan: Legal
Reform and Corporate Governance, Seiji Kawazoe, Associate General Manager, Sumitomo
Mitsui Trust Bank, Limited (Oct. 18, 2013). However, some bank officials acknowledge that
they have generally done a poor job on corporate governance issues to date, although they have
plans to become substantially more active in that area. Hiroshi Komori, Associate General
Manager, Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Limited, Global Management and Response to Foreign
Institutional Investors, Business Research Institute (Dec. 12, 2013).
89. See supra note 17.
90. See ACGA WHITE PAPER supra note 3. See also supra note 17.
91. See supra note 2.
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code. In many countries, the securities regulator drafts a corporate
governance code and requirements for disclosure relating to comply
or explain with code provisions promulgated by the stock exchange.>'
In Japan, however, the FSA is relatively weak compared to the
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry ("METI"), the business
lobby Keidanren, and the Ministry of Justice ("MOJ"), which is in
charge of amendments to the Companies Act. It therefore remains to
be seen how the FSA-TSE's current project to adopt a corporate
governance code in the near future will work in practice.'
C. ADJUSTING MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE TO
GLOBALIZATION
Given Japan's aging (and shrinking) population, Japan's
domestic market is destined to contract over time. In response,
virtually every Japanese company has a plan to shift a substantial
portion of its business overseas over time. One of the biggest
challenges contained within this effort is modifying prior domestic
management and governance structures and practices to effectively
manage multinational corporations.
There is considerable variation in the situations of Japanese
companies concerning integration of international operations. Some
Japanese companies, such as the major trading companies, already
have substantial experience with global operations that are
reasonably well integrated. 94 Other companies have developed
international business, but within the framework of a separate
international division that is removed from the company's normal
decision-making and oversight structure and procedures. As the
international portion of the business expands and assumes a greater
92. For a global listing of corporate governance codes, see Index of Codes, FUR. CORP.
GoV. INST., http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all-codes.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
93. See supra note 17.
94. For example, Mitsubishi Corporation, one of the leading trading companies, has over
600 subsidiaries and affiliates, with a well-established, global system for internal audit and
controls that integrates overseas operations. Yoshihito Yoshizawa, General Manager, Internal
Audit Department, Mitsubishi Corporation, Internal Audit and Internal controls at Mitsubishi
Corporation, Business Research Institute (Dec. 7, 2012). See also Corporate Profile: Fact Sheet,
MITSUBISHI CORP., http://www.mitsubishicorp.com/jp/en/about/profile/ (last visited Oct. 20,
2014).
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importance in overall operations, it becomes necessary to subject
international operations to regular controls and "reintegrate" it with
domestic operations in a unified structure.95 Some other large
Japanese corporations have internationalized rather suddenly
through very substantial overseas acquisitions that present the
challenge of finding the appropriate means of integrating a separate,
established foreign corporation with its own history and procedures
into the main corporate structure.96
In the initial phase of international expansion, the focus may
typically be on how to apply Japanese policies and procedures to
overseas subsidiaries and operations. However, as international
operations grow, it will become necessary to modify decision-making
and policies into a system that may be more effective globally than
the original, domestic-oriented Japanese system. How Japanese
companies respond to the challenge of internationalization of
business operations will have a potentially significant impact on
Japanese corporate governance and ultimately on the future business
success of Japanese companies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The popular critical view of a Japanese corporate governance
system that is stagnant fails to capture change and ongoing evolution
over the past fifteen years. One important and continuing theoretical
issue is the lack of a consistent, appropriate standard for evaluating
Japanese corporate governance and measuring change. Governance
95. One example is YKK Group, an unlisted Japanese company that is a global leader in
zippers and fasteners. International operations have grown to become a very significant portion
of business activity and must now be integrated into the "main" governance structure. Katsuya
Yumoto, Vice President, Legal and IP Department, YKK Corporation, "Reconsideration of
Authority and Decision-making in the Localization of Global Management" at YKK, Business
Research Institute (Aug. 28, 2013). See also Corporate Profile, YKK, http://www.ykk.com
/english/corporate/group/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (noting that eighty-eight of 108
affiliated companies and a majority of employees are located overseas).
96. One examples would be Japan Tobacco Inc., which acquired both the non-U.S. tobacco
business of RJR Nabisco Inc. in 1999 (one of the largest overseas acquisition by a Japanese
company) and Gallaher Group Plc. in 2007, and which has a separate overseas headquarters in
Geneva for its international operations. Its international arm, Japan Tobacco International, has
over 27,000 employees and operates in 120 countries. See, e.g. JTI at a -lance, JTI,
http://www.jti.com/our-company/jti-at-a-glance/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
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in Japan may indeed seem backward and unresponsive when
measured by formal board structure, including the number and role
of outside directors and the choice by an overwhelming majority of
Japanese corporations to continue the traditional structure of a
company with auditors rather than change to an "American-style"
company with committees.
Use of the role of independent directors as the sole or primary
criterion to evaluate corporate governance systems is problematic.
Such an approach reflects a standard based on American experience
and development of corporate governance with the purpose of
dealing with conflicts of interests to protect shareholders, and with
resulting practical benefits for companies utilizing independent
directors. The experience and goals in Japan are different, although
they do not provide a better basis for comparisons. The focus in
Japanese corporate governance on business performance and
increasing "corporate value" for stakeholders is also problematic,
particularly given the uncertain relationship between corporate
governance and business performance.
In addition to the lack of a common or accepted standard for
evaluation of governance systems, another fundamental problem in
evaluating corporate governance is the lack of data related to actual
practices. This is a problem everywhere, but is particularly acute in
Japan with respect to the role of institutions such as kansayaku.
Critics focus on shortcomings in the formal legal authority of
kansayaku compared to outside directors, while Japanese defenders
cite anecdotal evidence of a broader and more significant role for
kansayaku.
The importance of kansayaku in Japan and the lack of data on
their actual role make this area an important one for future research
on Japanese corporate governance. The scrutiny given to kansayaku
is justified since Japan has been the sole country in Asia to make
extensive efforts over three decades to strengthen the role of
kansayaku as the main monitor of management, rather than
increasing the number of outside directors to augment or replace such
a supervisory board. It does appear that recently all sides to this
debate have begun to provide more data and make more balanced,
functional comparisons between kansayaku and outside directors.
Hopefully, this trend will continue and strengthen in the future.
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This article identifies three fundamental issues for Japanese
corporate governance: the popular debate on strengthening the
monitoring function in Japanese corporations, separation of the
board's business advisory and monitoring functions, and dealing with
the president's informal power to make top-level appointments and
to linger beyond his term in office. A decade ago, it was thought that
all three of these issues would be addressed by the new company with
committees structure; however, this new structure proved highly
unpopular reportedly due to the envisioned role of the nomination
committee.
Somewhat surprisingly, it has been the large traditional
companies that have been at the forefront of evolution in Japanese
corporate governance. This change has been caused by a combination
of decline in institutions supporting the postwar system, outside
pressure for corporate governance reform, and, most importantly,
increasing business necessity to reform board practices to deal more
effectively with increasingly large, complex, and global business
organizations. But such change, not being legally required, has
occurred through experimentation at individual companies and there
are significant variations in approach.
Attempting to generalize these changes in practice over the past
decade results in a focus on a "hybrid" form of governance. "Hybrid"
generally refers to companies with auditors that add a number of
outside directors and a nomination committee. Functionally, this is a
method to create an alternative to the unpopular company with
committees structure that can nevertheless deal effectively with the
three fundamental corporate governance issues facing Japanese
companies discussed herein. At the same time, however, companies
with committees have proceeded to modify the board committee
approach to conform more closely with preexisting corporate
governance practices in Japan.
These ongoing trends may result in a kind of functional
convergence in which corporate governance practices at "hybrid"
companies with auditors begin to resemble actual practices at
companies with committees. Such convergence has the potential to
produce a new model of Japanese corporate governance, at least at
large corporations, to replace the classic postwar model and deal
effectively with current governance issues. However, at present, there
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
is no law or guideline that sets forth the features of such a model, and
it remains unclear if a new corporate governance code or other
measures to help spread best practices will define a new model of
Japanese corporate governance in the near future.
The biggest factor that may determine the future direction and
results of experimentation in corporate governance structures and
practices among large Japanese companies is whether, or to what
extent, domestic Japanese institutional investors become more active
in demanding change at Japanese companies. This, in part, relates
back to the prior question of whether a "standardized" hybrid model
that encapsulates spreads best practices can be produced in Japan.
Finally, the pace at which Japanese companies expand internationally
and make corresponding modifications to their management and
governance systems represents a separate set of business pressures
that may have an increasing effect on Japanese corporate governance.
Corporate governance in Japan is by no means stagnant despite
the relative lack of progress on certain highly visible issues such as the
role of outside directors. Japan was the first non-Western country to
develop economically, with its own experience and traditions, and
remains the most advanced country with corporate governance and
other systems that arguably differ the most from those in the U.S. As
such, it should continue to provide a rich source of opportunities for
deepening our understanding of corporate governance from a
comparative perspective.
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97. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., 2013 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY 3 (2013) available at http:/
www.tse.or.jp/english/market/data/shareownership/b7gje60000003tOu-att/e-bunpu 0 13-2.pdf.
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Figure 1. Hybrid Model -Asahi Glass Corporation 98
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